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Key Issues in Disentangling the
Kenyan Crisis
Evictions, Autochthony and Land Privatization
Claire Médard
1 In Kenya, as elsewhere, it is not unusual to construe in xenophobic terms the injustices
that  have  been  experienced.  Grievances  have  been  translated  into  a  language  of
indigenous and territorial claims to land. Not going along with this rhetoric enables us to
take the measure of existing injustices.
2 In order to cast light on the land problem in Kenya, we will define it at first in a simple
way. We will limit our focus to cases of eviction of regular occupants of a piece of land,
such  as:  landless  peasants  or  squatters  evicted  from  government  land  like  gazetted
forests (Mt Elgon and Mt Kenya forests, for instance); peasants who lost access to land
following legal privatization (in relation to the gradual extension of land registration);
peasants who lost their land in politically-instigated ethnic conflicts;1 and finally peasants
who were left out of land redistributions by the State to compensate cases of eviction.
3 On the whole, more and more youth from rural areas do not have access to land for
cultivation. Some of them, who are educated, aspire for a different life. Those who will
provide for their families solely from the land are few. This has been the case for a
number of years, as demonstrated by migrations since the colonial days in search for
work. However, it now seems a line is being crossed as less and less poor have access to
land, even as a fallback resource. This is the case in towns as well as in the rural areas.
Casting light on the recent crises through an analysis of population growth and land
shortage would be the subject of a separate paper2. In this paper, I have opted to carry out
a political and legal analysis of the land crisis in order to underline its political dynamics.
Despite structural constraints related to population and land, the recourse to violence
should not be viewed as the only possible response nor should its legitimization through
xenophobic  political  ideologies  be  seen  as  the  only  solution3.  Since  independence,
violence has taken over from intense negotiations over land allocations, which led to a
rather inequitable form of ethnic bargaining, to which today’s State legitimacy crisis is
linked. Kenya is no longer experiencing the momentum of land redistributions as in the
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1960s and 1970s, which enabled the neo-patrimonial State4 to perpetuate itself in spite of
corrupt and authoritarian practices.
4 From the simple definition that we gave in the beginning, it is worth noting that the
problem of access to land and evictions is not as straight forward as expected. First, we
will  examine  the  issue  of  indigenous  land  claims  separately  from  the  issue  of  land
injustices  and inequalities,  which then will  enable  us  to  understand how indigenous
claims and neo-patrimonial practices by political leaders contributed to the current land
crisis.
 
The issue of autochthony
5 Whereas the language of autochthony5 tries to lock us in an essentialist vision of identity,
it  is  inconceivable  to  grasp  a  phenomenon  of  this  nature  without  considering  it
dynamically. The shaping of new identity platforms must be interpreted in their strategic
dimension, in relation to the local, national and even international political context.
6 Autochthony is characterized in Kenya by territorial land claims that entertain the idea
of local resources as belonging exclusively to those born and bred on the land. As such
“indigenous” communities and access to resources are defined in territorial terms. At the
scale of a nation-state, the idea of a corresponding land-based community is widespread,
but in this case autochthony is defined at a sub-national level. How can this be explained?
In Kenya, the link made between land, territory and ethnicity has nothing to do with
ancestry and is, first and foremost, part of an administrative tradition6. In the colonial
era,  administration contributed to shape ethnic territories by introducing the idea of
reserved lands (ethnic reserves, White Highlands). Internal borders came to play a role in
the territorial and ethnic definition of ownership of local resources, particularly land.
This heritage translated into the current administrative practice of assigning citizens to
regions of  origin,  a  fictitious affiliation to a  large extent  in a  context  of  widespread
migrations  at  a  national  scale.  The  administration’s  pervasive  territorial  rationale  is
reflected, in its form at least, in the language of autochthony. The majimbo ideology,
which emerged in the 1960s, then re-emerged in the 1990s, in the sunset days of Daniel
arap  Moi’s  regime,  and  again  in  2007,  during  the  presidential  campaigns,  backs
autochthony from a political point of view. It advocates for a local and ethnic definition




7 The list  of  autochthonous claims is  very long,  even though those that  caused ethnic
violence are fewer. Examples abound and some of these claims might even take us by
surprise because they refer to groups that are not always identified in ethnic terms at the
national level. For instance, the Kalenjin, Luhya and Mijikenda umbrella identities might
be divided into several sub-ethnicities - which can themselves, be subdivided into smaller
units. One might choose to stress one level or another of belonging depending on a given
context.  In its own way each level of ethnicity has acquired a territorial  basis.  Some
identities  fit  into  each  other  like  Russian  dolls  while  others are  locked  in  a  binary
opposition.  In  the  case  of  fitted  levels  of  identity  there  seems  to  be  so  to  say  no
contradiction in stressing one or another level (national and ethnic identity, as well as
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sub-tribe)  in  a  given  situation.  Nevertheless  in  some  circumstances,  they  become
incompatible,  as  shown by the example of  denunciation of  Kalenjin ethnicity  by the
various  sub-groups  which  are  supposed  to  belong  under  its  umbrella.  This  happens
especially in cases of territorial competition. These levels of identity assertion can in turn
be understood in relation to levels of antagonisms (for example the Kalenjin against the
Luhya or, at a lower level, the Sabaot against the Bukusu). Conflicts generally contribute
to  setting these  levels  of  identity:  in  times  of  crisis,  the  Kalenjins  unite  against  the
Kikuyus or the Luhyas and, a lower level, in spite of their internal conflicts, the Sabaot
gang  up  against  the  Bukusu.  Ethnicity  becomes  flexible  or  rigid  depending  on  the
circumstances, and that is what needs to be kept in mind, just like the importance of
underlying territorial resource-based stakes.
8 In the Rift Valley Province, the Kalenjin are laying a major claim on the land formerly
held by Europeans, while the Maasai are claiming back former grazing land within their
districts which have been cultivated by migrants from other regions of Kenya. Though
these two communities have strong pastoral traditions, they are now staking claim on the
land with a view to being in charge of their agricultural development. They refer to land
evictions for which they blame a particular ethnic community collectively (Europeans,
the Kikuyu, the Luhya, etc.). In addition to the overall Kalenjin claim to the Rift Valley
Province, there are also separate demands for land by Kalenjin subgroups: Sabaot, Pokot,
Nandi,  Keiyo,  Marakwet,  Tugen,  Kipsigis,  etc.  These sub-groups sometimes come into
direct competition with each other, as demonstrated by the incidents of conflict between
the Pokot and the Marakwet in northern Marakwet, and the rivalry between the Nandi
and the Keiyo in Uasin Gishu District over the repossession of European land. An internal
conflict among the Sabaot7, which brought about ethnic polarization along the lines of
two  sub-groups  namely  the  Ndorobo  (or Ogiek)  and  the  Bok,  led  to  unprecedented
incidents  of  violence  in  Mount  Elgon  in  the  period  preceding  the  December 2007
elections. At stake was the control of land resources through control of political power.
The  up-scaling  of  the  conflict  from an intra-Sabaot  one  to  one  between Sabaot  and
Bukusu neighbours, which is a reminder of the conflicts in the 1990s, might be viewed as
an outlet intended to satisfy the need for land among the Sabaot with the expulsion of the
Bukusu from a wider area.
9 The indigenous claim by the Ogiek or Ndorobo in Mount Elgon, is not an isolated case in
the  Rift  Valley  Province.  The  identity  statement  by  the  Ogiek  emphasizes  an
autochthonous right to land and a separate ethnic identity, with regard to the rest of the
sub-groups of Kalenjin speakers. An alliance between the various groups that claim a
“hunter-gatherer” identity in the Rift Valley Province has appeared. The Sengwer who
live the Cherangani hills, the Ogiek of Mount Elgon and Mau forests claim to be in a way
more indigenous than other Kalenjin-speakers in the Rift Valley: a discourse which backs
the  demand  for  privileged  access  to  forest  resources,  which  does  not  preclude  the
conversion of forests into agricultural land.
10 In the 1990s other claims of indigenous nature, along the coast, in central (in the Meru
and Embu districts) and also in western Kenya were voiced. During the colonial days the
border between the Luo and the Luhya was disputed, not anymore despite some lingering
demands.  In  Nyanza  Province  occupied  by  a  Luo  majority,  the  Basuba  and  Kuria
separatisms were incited by the Moi regime. Demands by the Teso in Western Province,
occupied  by  the  Luhya  majority,  caused  a  crisis.  Tensions  translated  more  into
administrative demands (border reviews and creation of new districts) than into demands
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for land in these cases. Along the coast, land is a major contentious issue. The level of
Mijikenda ethnicity has been defined in relation to a Swahili identity within an urban
context in Mombasa.8 During the 1990s, a conflict orchestrated by powerful individuals
within the Moi regime, exploiting xenophobic sentiments, pitted the Mijikenda against
the upcountry people. At a lower notch, rivalries between various Mijikenda subgroups
emerged.  Thus,  along the coast  as  well  as  in Western and Rift  Valley Provinces,  the
majimbo ideology, that is based on the idea regional preference was advocated for by
local politicians at different times in history.




12 Autochthonous  discourses  that  have  emerged  since  the  1980s,  are  at  the  crossroads
between  local  land  grievances  and  international  platforms  interested  in  indigenous
groups, particularly the Ogiek and the Maasai,  and also,  at a different scale,  between
national  and local  political  strategies.  Indigenous  claims  came to  be  known through
violence in 1990s.
13 Xavier Péron emphasizes that  in the 1980s there were several  groups advocating for
indigenous  platforms  among  the  Maasai  fighting  for  different  ideas  of  “common”
interest.  Local  authorities in Narok tried to make their presence felt  in international
circles in the defence of indigenous people’s rights in the same way as non governmental
organizations  who were  fighting against  them on a  daily  basis.9 To  mention just  an
example,  the  activities  of  the  local  authorities  went  against  the  local  community’s
interests in the management of Loita Forest, at a time when local authorities sought to
transform the area into a second Maasai Mara with the exclusion of its regular residents.
Examples of abuse of office, corruption, amassing of wealth by local political leaders and
eviction of  ordinary residents  were not  going unnoticed and some NGO voiced their
condemnation. The issue of repossession of this indigenous platform by political leaders,
whose objective was merely to maintain themselves in power and to guarantee their own
access to resources, re-emerged more clearly in the 1990s.
14 The Moi regime, which was then under threat due to the reintroduction of multi-party
politics,  tried  to  perpetuate  its  rule  by  all  means  including  the  encouragement  of
xenophobic violence and a political alliance around the Kalenjin and “minority tribes.”
National political strategy and local demands merged in the KAMATUSA10 claims on the
Rift Valley Province, to which are associated different incidents of violence organized by
Maasai, Kalenjin and Samburu leaders in the 1990s. The Kikuyu and the Gusiis settled in
the Maasai districts were targeted in evictions orchestrated by Maasai leaders with some
complicity on the part of the administration. The Kikuyu, the Luhya, the Gusii and the
Luo settled in areas west  of  Nakuru were targeted in violence organized by Kalenjin
leaders still with some complicity on the part of the Moi government.
15 The violent trend observed in autochthonous claims cannot as such be explained by their
artificial nature, which should however be emphasized, since it has been instrumental for
political  strategists.  Autochthonous  claims  have  been  used  for  political  gain.
Autochthony, as a political discourse, legitimates the recourse to violence to settle land
grievances.  A territorial  definition of  land ownership as  supported by some political
leaders is presented as a means to fight evictions viewed in ethnic terms.
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16 The  principle  of  political  autochthony,  backed  by  some  leaders,  made  it  possible  to
legitimize untold violence. Trapped in the local and national discourses on autochthony,
some international  institutions provided alibi  for this violence.  No leader is  ready to
commit political suicide by admitting that the hijacking of access to land by politicians is
the root of major land problems, unless it means denouncing a political rival or better
still  accuse an ethnic community that would shoulder the blame for its leaders.  This
explains the success of  autochthony.  The political  position of  defending autochthony
enables a leader to hide his real motives while acting as the champion of a collective
cause such as land. Nevertheless, the fight is said to be collective while the gains are
individual. Leaders of these communities began by eating themselves, as shown by the
examples of D. arap Moi and William ole Ntimama, a Maasai leader who as still active in
2008.
17 Land grabbing is the best shared activity among the different generations of political
leaders in Kenya. Combined with a territorial strategy that is rooted in the ideology of
autochthony, the damage they have caused has not yet been measured. In Kenya’s recent
history, some leaders, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, have preferred chauvinistic
stances and xenophobic political mobilization to denouncing corrupt political practices.
Mobilisation across the ethnic divides against corrupt political  practices still  remains
minimal, despite parliamentary reports which provide evidence.11 In Trans Nzoia District,
a movement initiated by Father Dolan was quickly quelled by a class of administrators
and politicians.  Whereas inequalities  in accessing land result  above all  from political
options and practices, they are generally presented in ethnic terms.
 
Local land situation and eviction processes
18 Legal privatization of land has been presented as a solution to all problems. It is enough
to highlight the importance of the paradigm of the title deed in a context of obvious
tension over land and the emergence of a territorial stake in land outside the scope of
legality.
19 The  first  attempt  to  control  the  reproduction  of  African  societies  was  territorial  in
nature.  By introducing internal  borders,  the colonial  government  blocked settlement
frontiers  and movements  of  pastoral  people.  The  key  arrangement  for  colonial  land
evictions was legal (through the creation of the legal fiction that crown land represented)
12. African settlements, now restricted in their expansion ended up getting the legal status
of communal land (trustland). In the next stage, the transformation of access to land was
characterized by  a  legal  process  of  land registration.  The  early  introduction of  land
privatization is  undoubtedly  not  foreign to  the  success  of  today’s  legal  privatization
paradigm. Legal private land ownership spread to African areas in the 1950s from the
European  lands.  Title  deeds  were  considered  as  guaranteeing  security  of  tenure.
Nevertheless,  the introduction title deeds contributed to the creation of new rules of
access to land that  destabilized the previous forms of  regulation.  The fact  that  legal
privatization became synonymous with security of tenure, at the discourse level, conceals
the injustices that its implementation gave rise to and negates the fact that the two terms
are far from being equivalent. In the context of recent ethnic conflicts, the title deed was
worth nothing in the face of territorial claims that go beyond it and define legitimacy of
access to land at a non statutory level. It is worth noting, despite everything, that the
situation  of  people  who  had  title  deeds,  in  relation  to  others,  was  different  in  the
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medium-term. The title deed, where it existed, was a form of guarantee, insofar as land
could not  be repossessed by a  third party without  other  formalities.  In 2008,  a  step
further was taken within the urban context with regard to awareness about this legal
obstacle: some gangs endeavoured to demand the title deed in addition to confiscating
the property. Safeguarding ownership is not necessarily synonymous with privatization,
except that today the title deed has became the panacea. Nevertheless, the extent of legal
privatization  and  the  idea  that  it  is operative  are  another  fiction  that  needs  to  be
denounced. From local histories, a wide range of situations exist in Kenya. They relate to
land regimes and specific forms of land ownership that also contribute to explaining
particular forms of expropriation that have locally emerged.
20 Some regions were subject to a legal process of land registration, others, mainly the arid
regions, were not included. Registered land is found mainly in the most fertile regions, in
the highlands of the south western quarter of the country. Yet, even in this part of the
country, the process is blocked in some places. In areas where land registries exist and
where it is in theory possible to get a title, in practice, ordinary residents don’t always
have  access  to  them.  Areas  where  it  is  possible  to  get  a  title  enter  into  two  broad
categories: areas where land registration was introduced more than thirty years ago; and
areas where large-scale farms were kept largely intact.
21 In the former trust lands registered from the 1950s up to the 1970s, in Central, Western
and Nyanza provinces and in some districts of the Rift Valley province, legally defined
family estates exist since the land was generally registered in the name of a grand-father.
Titles have not necessarily been collected from the administration unless the need was
felt (for instance in cases of land transactions). The grandfather’s land, at present too
small to sustain all his descendants, might be considered now as clan land: it serves for
burials, when no other land was acquired in a life-time. Large-scale farms in the former
White  Highlands  which  might  have  been  transferred  to  African  owners  and  only
minimally subdivided also have titles.
22 To obtain a title deed is nearly impossible in some places located in the highlands, even
though the area under trust land has shrunk and most lands have undergone registration,
though they might be at different stages of the programme implementation. In some
instances the process of land registration was blocked by conflicts and by the slowness of
bureaucratic procedures. Titles are also difficult to get in former European areas, in cases
where  large-scale  farms  were  subdivided  into  many shares;  as  well  as,  in  particular
settlement schemes on government land such as Chebyuk in Mount Elgon.
23 During the 1980s and 1990s, the process of land registration was carried out in some parts
of Kenya such as Meru, Marakwet or Trans Mara and experienced many difficulties which
slowed it down. It sparked violence, because the legal process of land individualization
and privatization was seen as a way to redefine land rights on a territorial basis: only a
given group is entitled to land in a given location. Due to this, the rights of some old time
residents  were  not  recognized  during  the  registration  process.  In  areas  where  land
registration was introduced first, individually demarcated plots existed. In spite of this
fact land evictions were organised or could not be prevented given the rules laid out for
land  registration.  When  actual  occupation  of  land  did  not  provide  landmarks  for
individual property, as it is often the case in pastoral regions, the possibility of losing
access to land was multiplied. In the pastoral zones, the process of land registration went
through several steps, which constituted as many renewed opportunities for evictions.
During  the  first  stage,  collective  ranches  were  put  in  place.  Their  creation  did  not
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preclude the possibility of introducing individual ranches, quite the opposite. Influential
people hastened to start private ranches, at the same time sabotaging the spirit of the
collective enterprise. During a second phase, the directive became legal privatization of
the entire land, with renewed consequences in term of inequalities in sharing land and
access to resources. The legal framework of the reform has been used or misused by a
ruling class for its own benefit.
24 Former European lands also went through a process of subdivision, in several stages.
Today when farms are subdivided in large portions of land, the processing of titles is
expected to take four years with the help of a lawyer specialized in the field of land
administration and rights. In the case of large-scale farms subdivided in numerous plots
for the benefit of a large number of recipients (land buying companies or cooperatives),
issues of management, usurpation of rights and financial difficulties make it impossible to
get  a  title.  According  to  an  official  source,  in  2007,  among  the  twenty  land  buying
cooperatives bordering to the natural reserves of the Mt Elgon in Trans Nzoia, only two
succeeded in getting individual land titles for their members. To acquire a title is a long
process which requires funds and determination and brings out inequalities. Members of
land-buying companies are especially vulnerable in this regard and some members are
evicted with ease through various strategies.  During the ethnic clashes of  the 1990s,
everywhere  in  the  Rift  Valley  province,  membership  in  land-buying  companies  was
highly disputed; with no real legal mechanism to guarantee land ownership.
25 Forests,  under  the  direct  control  of  government,  have  been  considered  widely  like
potential land reserves, as demonstrated by the Moi regime. Although classified, forest
land was converted into agricultural land in a temporary or permanent way. Whether
they were classified as governmental land (under the jurisdiction of the central power) or
as  trust  land  (under  the  jurisdiction  of  local  authorities),  they  have  been  managed
without a long-term policy, and access set in a discretionary way. In accordance with its
neo-patrimonial  practices,  the  State  decided  whether  or  not  to  apply  some  rules
concerning the protection of forests or distorted them for its own profit or political gain.
As a result, at times, people are allowed to engage in different activities in the forest
reserves and,  at  times,  they are not,  an occurrence creating strong resentment.  This
mode  of  government  has  left  its  imprint  in  Mount  Elgon  and  Mount  Kenya.  It  is
responsible for an ecological disaster in the Mau escarpment. Kipsigis farmers managed
to buy land in the forest reserve of the Mau through the making of corrupt political
leaders both Kipsigis and Maasai  from 1997 to 2004.  It  took time for the new Kibaki
administration to put an end to this colonization.13 The settlers ended up by being chased,
after having destroyed the forest. As a result, and this is not unusual in Kenya, the person
who actually bought the land was evicted whereas the politicians who actually made the
deal and ended up benefiting from the transactions were not disturbed.  Forest lands
under the protection of local authorities, such as part of the destroyed Mau forest, were
not managed in a better way. Local authorities have in some cases organised the stealing,
whereas they were supposed to manage forest resources for the benefit of the ordinary
residents of the locality.
 
Conclusion
26 The idea of a territorial claim to land, defined by administrative limits, without taking
into account work invested in land but rather autochthonous demands, is presented by
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some leaders as a strategy to fight against evictions understood solely in ethnic terms.
This type of discourse has, to some extent, justified the recourse to violence and has
contributed, through the conflicts it created, to more land evictions. Is there a peaceful
territorial  solution  to  land  problems  in  Kenya?  In  the  past  there  have  been  strong
pressures to translate political autochthony into law and this might happen again in the
context of the management of the post-electoral crisis.
27 Over the years, the State’s hesitations over the issue of territorial and ethnic claims to
local resources are noticeable: backing them then taking a legal stance in defence of the
right to individual property. In principle, a title does not take into consideration neither
the place nor the person, neither are the means by which a title is acquired questioned.
During  the  1990s,  political  autochthony  sustained  by  the  Moi  regime contributed  to
create confusion.
28 From  a  different  perspective  the  Bomas  constitutional  project14 also  reflects  this
hesitation, by insisting both on the protection of individual rights and at the same time
referring to ancestral rights to land. In a way it attempted to circumscribe the legitimacy
of autochthonous claims: only hunter gatherers were specifically mentioned as entitled to
claim  for  such  rights.  However,  autochthonous  claims  are  common  in  Kenya  and
contradict  the  idea  of  the  sanctity  of  private  property:  they  might  not  be  so  easily
contained.
29 If the State is serious about accommodating these two apparently contradictory positions,
it should come up with a system of compensation for legal acquisitions of land outside
one’s autochthonous “territory” for people who had bought land in an area they do not
“belong”  to.  In  many  cases,  political  and  administrative  intermediaries  benefited
financially from the sale of land everywhere in Kenya and created the problem. The best
would be to force the actual thieves or crooks, which most commonly belong or belonged
to government, to pay for compensation.
30 Autochthonous claims defend the idea of a collective responsibility in evictions, blaming
them on another ethnic group: the Europeans chased the Sabaots from Trans Nzoia, in
turn the Sabaots attempted to chase the Bukusus who had settled in the European land of
Trans Nzoia. This perception should be discarded as it carries in itself injustice. On the
other hand,  individual  cases of  land confiscations should be documented in order to
attain justice and redress blatant cases of evictions. Why is it so important to protect the
rights of the poor and their access to land? One might reasonably consider land as a
fallback resource.  The importance of  access to land is  illustrated by the obsession of
buying a plot. Buying a plot is seen as a necessity by many, a dream that only a few
people, belonging to the middle class, will  achieve today, while choosing the location
carefully taking into account ethnic and territorial considerations.
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NOTES
1. They  can  be  referred  to  as  such  without  losing  sight  of  the  essentially  political
dimension of “ethnic conflicts” (throughout the 1990s and during the 2007–2008 period,
in particular).
2. J. Oucho 2002, V. Golaz 2002.
3. This term applies to Kenya in sofar as it  describes hatred for the ‘other’  within a
national context.
4. The neo-patrimonial  State’s  power is  based on the confusion between private and
public spheres. Refer to D. Bourmaud, 1988.
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5. For a discussion on autochthony, on claims to be “sons of the soil,” see Lonsdale J., 2008,
Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2 (2), p. 305–314. “Indigenous land claims” might be seen as
the words commonly used in Kenya to refer to the phenomenon of autochthony.
6. C. Médard, 1999.
7. C. Médard, 2008.
8. J. Willis, 1993.
9. X. Péron, 1996.
10. Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu.
11. Republic of Kenya, 2002, 2004.
12. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, 1991.
13. D. Ruysschaert, 2007.
14. The Bomas constitution was drafted by the Kenyan Commission set up to revise the
constitution. It was amended and became the Wako constitution, then rejected during the
referendum of November 21, 2005.
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